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1

JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1996).
ISSUES
There are only two issues before this Court.

Both are

straightforward and involve only the interpretation of written
agreements:
I.

Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment

to the plaintiffs on the issue of whether the defendants complied
with specific language of a trust deed in order obtain security
under that trust deed for additional loans that were made nearly
two years after the trust deed was executed?

Because this issue

involves a grant of summary judgment, the plaintiffs agree that
review of this issue is under a "standard of correctness."

Stien

v. Marriott Ownership Resorts, 944 P.2d 374, 377 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) .
II.

Did the district court correctly grant summary judgment

to the plaintiffs on the issue of whether defendant Peterson was
entitled to default interest under the terms of a promissory note
whose due date was amended to a later time?
reviewed on a "standard of correctness."

This issue is also

Stien. 944 P.2d at 377.

DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES. AND REGULATIONS
This appeal turns solely on the language of the parties'
written agreements.

There are no statutes, rules, or regulations

whose interpretation is determinative of the appeal or of central
importance to the appeal.
1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.
This appeal involves a dispute between plaintiffs Robert L.
Harrington and Harrington Properties, Inc. ("HPI") and defendant
Marilyn Hamilton Peterson over their respective rights and
remedies arising out of the development and*sale of a house built
by plaintiffs on an undeveloped lot sold to them by Peterson (the
"Sunset Oaks Property").

Mrs. Peterson sold the lot to HPI

pursuant to a promissory note (the "Peterson Note'") that was
secured by a second-position deed of trust on the Sunset Oaks
Property (the "Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II").
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the District Court.
On July 26, 1994, the plaintiffs filed their Complaint
seeking, inter alia, declaratory judgment with respect to several
issues arising out of the sale of the Sunset Oaks Property.

(R.

I.) 1
On July 17, 1996, plaintiffs moved for partial summary
judgment on the issue of whether subsequent advances made by
defendant Peterson to Harrington in and after February 1993 were
secured by the June 21, 1991 Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II as claimed
by defendant Peterson.

(R. 783.)

On December 10, 1996, the

court entered an order granting plaintiffs' motion.
1041.)

(R. 1038-

In granting that motion, the district court determined

*A11 references to the record are to the page numbers of the
original record as paginated by the clerk of the district court
pursuant to Rule 1 K b ) (2) of the Utah Rules of Appellate
Procedure.
2

that certain monies loaned in 1993 by defendant Peterson to
plaintiff HPI were not secured by the 1991 Sunset Oaks Trust Deed
II.
On March 4, 1997# plaintiffs filed a second motion for
partial summary judgment on the issue of whether an agreement
between the parties dated December 8, 1992, extended the due date
on the Peterson Note so as to preclude default and default
interest from accruing prior to February 22, 1994.
1059.)

(R. 1057-

On June 25, 1997, the district court entered an order

granting that motion.

(R. 1130-34.)

On August 1, 1997, the parties filed a stipulation for an
order dismissing all other issues.

This stipulation was based

upon a settlement that allowed defendants to appeal these two
issues and that reserved the issue of attorney fees.
38.)

(R. 1137-

The district court entered a judgment and order of

dismissal in accordance with the stipulation on August 7, 1997.2
(R. 1139-41.)

2

In their factual recitation, defendants set out a number of
asserted "facts" that are irrelevant to the issues on appeal and
that relate solely to the claims that defendants settled for
consideration. Such argument is improper. Carrier v. Pro-Tech
Restoration. 909 P.2d 271, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (parties
cannot contest issues on appeal that are conceded below), aff'd,
944 P.2d 346 (Utah 1997). Therefore plaintiffs do not address
those facts herein.
3

Statement of Facts.3
The following facts were undisputed before the district
court in connection with the motions for partial summary
judgment:
1.

In early 1991, Mr. Harrington became aware of a listing

for sale by defendant Peterson of the Sunset Oaks Property.

(R.

409.)
2.

Mr. Harrington contacted Mrs. Peterson and expressed

interest in purchasing the Sunset Oaks Property for the purpose

of building

a house for resale.

Mr. Harrington

offered

to buy

the property for $95,000 if Mrs. Peterson would subordinate her
trust deed to the anticipated construction loan trust deed, to
which she agreed.
3.

(R. 409.)

In anticipation of the closing on the Sunset Oaks

Property, Mr. Harrington applied for a construction loan with
Guardian State Bank, to be secured by a first trust deed on the
Sunset Oaks Property.
4.

(R. 412.)

On June 21, 1991, Mr. Harrington acquired the Sunset

Oaks Property from Mrs. Peterson for $95,000,00, by executing a
promissory note in that amount payable to Mrs. Peterson (the
"Peterson Note").

(R. at 411.)

A copy of the Peterson Note is

included in the Addendum hereto at Tab A.

defendants do not contend on appeal that the district court
Qrred in granting summary judgment because there were material
facts in dispute. Rather, defendants argue only that the
district court erred with respect to its legal rulings.
4

5.

In the two places for an interest term to be inserted

in the form note, the abbreviation "N/A" was typed in.
6.

(R. 428.)

Payment of the Peterson Note was secured by a second-

position Deed of Trust on the Sunset Oaks Property (the "Sunset
Oaks Trust Deed II").

(Id.)

A copy of the Sunset Oaks Trust

Deed is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab B.
7.

The Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II states:

For the Purpose of Securing:
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
note of even date hereof in the principal sum of $95,000,
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the
time, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth,
and any extension and/or renewals or modifications thereof;
(2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein
contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or
advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his
successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note
or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of
Trust: and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced
by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof,
together with interest thereon as herein provided.
(R. at 430 (emphasis added).)
8.

Almost immediately after the closing, the project ran

into delays.4

(R. 414-15.)

Because of these delays and

increased construction costs, Mr. Harrington informed Mrs.
Peterson in September 1992 that the proposed construction could
4

First, the subdivision's Architectural Design Committee did
not approve the proposed design of the house until October 17,
1991, with minor modifications. Then, HPI discovered that the
proposed location was solid "fill" to a significant depth,
preventing the pouring of foundations as originally designed and
requiring excavation to a much deeper level, removing all the
fill material and hauling in new dirt. The fill problem also
forced HPI to pour large concrete columns and supports as part of
the foundation, to use more steel and to change the deck design
to larger logs. These and other unexpected problems delayed
construction and increased costs.
5

not be completed without additional funds.

Mr. Harrington told

Mrs. Peterson that he had no other funds available to finish the
project because of his recently filed personal bankruptcy, but
that he would work with her in any way to complete it.

It was

then proposed that Mrs. Peterson advance up to an additional
$75,000 for construction.
9.

(R. 417.)

As a result, Harrington, HPI, and Peterson entered into

a written agreement on December 8, 1992 (the "December 8
Agreement").

A copy of the December 8 Agreement 'is included in

the Addendum hereto at Tab C.

That agreement provides in part as

follows:
4.
Payment Due Date: Payment of the sum owed by
Harrington under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note
($95,000) and payment of the sums advanced by Peterson under
the terms of this Agreement (not to exceed an additional
$75,000) shall be due on the date the Property is sold by
the Owner or is otherwise transferred, conveyed or assigned.
The parties agree that Peterson's sole recourse to
recover the sums of money advanced by her under the terms of
this Agreement, plus interest and attorney fees, and to
recover the sum of Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000)
owed to her under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note,
shall be against the Property and/or the proceeds arising
from its sale or transfer.
(R. 450 (emphasis added).)
10.

In February 1993, the parties reached an understanding

in which Mrs. Peterson agreed to provide additional funds to
complete construction on the house.

Mr. Harrington sent a letter

dated February 18, 1993 (the "February 18 Letter Agreement")5 to
5

In paragraph 28 of her Affidavit, Mrs. Peterson states that
she loaned "additional" monies "pursuant to a new letter
agreement signed by Robert L. Harrington dated February 18, 1993.
(R. 178.)
6

Mrs. Peterson.

(R. 178, 890.)

A copy of the February 18 Letter

Agreement is included in the Addendum hereto at Tab D.
11.

Mrs. Peterson received the February 18 Letter Agreement

but took no action to respond to it except to advance additional
funds.
12.

(R. 890.)
The February 18 Letter Agreement' states:

This letter will confirm that any money advanced by you,
above and beyond the $75,000 (December 8, 1992 Agreement),
for the purpose of construction of the home located at 1656
South Sunset Oaks Dr., will be returned to you with interest
consistent with the rate of interest in our Agreement dated
December 8, 1992, and will be returned to you prior to the
distribution of any proceeds to Harrington Properties, Inc.
The sale of the house will be the sole source of the return
of this money.
(R. at 224.)
13.

The February 18 Letter Agreement and the checks

provided by Mrs. Peterson are the only written documents relating
to an agreement of the parties in February 1993 for Peterson to
advance additional monies.
14.

(R. 814.)

Pursuant to the February 18 Letter Agreement, defendant

Peterson "loaned the additional sum of $69,626.84 . . . ."

(R.

178, 814.)
15.

There was no promissory note reflecting the $69,626.84

loaned pursuant to the February 18 Letter Agreement, nor is there
any document reciting that the monies loaned pursuant to that
letter agreement are secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II.
(R. 814-15.)

7

16.

At no time did Mr. Harrington ever agree that the funds

advanced pursuant to that February 18 Letter Agreement would be
secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II.
17.

(R. 815.)

On December 5, 1993, Mr. Harrington received an offer

to purchase the Sunset Oaks Property for $472,500.
Mr. Harrington accepted the offer, and the sale was closed on
February 24, 1994.

(R. 422, 882.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

I.

Defendants challenge on several theories the district

court's award of partial summary judgment that the Sunset Oaks
Trust Deed II did not secure their advances in and after February
1993.

First, defendants argue that clause (3) of the trust deed,

specifically addressed to "additional loans or advances hereafter
. . . made to Trustor," does not control because the loans were
not "unrelated."

However, neither the word "unrelated" nor its

concept can be found in the language of clause (3). Second,
defendants argue, on various creative readings, that clauses (1),
(2), and (4) of the trust deed also govern this transaction.

As

discussed below, defendants' position is contrary to the plain
language of the trust deed and reads out of the trust deed clause
(3)'s specific application to "additional advances."

Third,

defendants argue that even if clause (3) controls, the February
18 Letter Agreement "meets the requirements of a promissory note,
and indicates a grant of a security interest in the Sunset Oaks
Property."

Brief of Appellants at 14. However, the February 18

Letter Agreement at most only provides that "the sale of the
8

house will be the sole source of the return of this money" and
makes absolutely no mention of being "secured by [the Sunset Oaks
Trust Deed II]."

Moreover, defendants' argument is further

contradicted by the parties' practical interpretation of the
trust deed in the December 8 Agreement, drafted by Peterson's
counsel, which complies with clause (3) in reciting that the
additional advances therein are collateralized by the Sunset Oaks
Trust Deed II.
II.

Defendants also challenge the district court's grant of

partial summary judgment that no default interest accrued on the
Peterson Note prior to February 24, 1994, the amended due date of
the note.

Defendants concede that no interest accrued between

June 21, 1991, and March 21, 1992, the original due date of the
loan, because "N/A" was typed in the blanks for the applicable
interest rate.

Brief of Appellants at 14. Defendants argue that

they are entitled to default interest from March 21, 1992,
forward, even though the December 8 Agreement extended the due
date of the Peterson Note to the "date the property is sold,"
because the December 8 Agreement "neither forgives nor excuses
interest on that Note."

Id. at 15. However, by that amendment,

the Peterson Note was not and could not be in default until the
end of its term, i.e., the date the property was sold (February
24, 1994).

Moreover, the December 8 Agreement confirms in its

other provisions that the amount to be paid on the Peterson Note
on the due date was the principal amount of $95,000 only.

The

only interest mentioned in that agreement relates exclusively to
9

the new monies advanced and not to the Peterson Note.

Therefore,

no interest, default or otherwise, applied to the Peterson Note
between June 21, 1991, and February 24, 1994.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT THE FEBRUARY 1993
ADDITIONAL ADVANCES WERE NOT SECURED BY THE SUNSET OAKS
TRUST DEED II,
Granting plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment,

the district court held that the monies loaned by defendant
Peterson pursuant to the February 18 Letter Agreement were not
secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II.6

For the reasons set

forth below, this Court should affirm the district court's
decision.
A.

The District Court Properly Held that the Additional
Advances are Governed by Clause (3) of the Trust Deed.
1.

The plain language of clause (3) applies to the
February 1993 advances.

The Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II provides that it is for the
purpose of securing four categories of payments, as follows:
For the Purpose of Securing:
(1) payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory
note of even date hereof in the principal sum of $95,000,
made by Trustor, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the
time, in the manner and with interest as therein set forth,
and any extension and/or renewals or modifications thereof;
(2) the performance of each agreement of Trustor herein
contained; (3) the payment of such additional loans or
advances as hereafter may be made to Trustor, or his
successors or assigns, when evidenced by a promissory note
or notes reciting that they are secured by this Deed of
defendants loaned $69,626.84 pursuant to the February 18
Letter Agreement. Of that amount, summary judgment was granted
as to all but $4,898.81, payment of which to Guardian State Bank
by defendants was secured by clause (2) of the trust deed.
10

Trust; and (4) the payment of all sums expended or advanced
by Beneficiary under or pursuant to the terms hereof,
together with interest thereon as herein provided.
Addendum, Tab B.
In interpreting the plain language of this trust deed, the
district court held:
The Court finds that the monies advanced by defendant
Peterson pursuant to the February 18, 1993 letter were
"additional loans or advances" within the meaning of clause
(3), and that clause (3) applies to the monies loaned or
advanced by Peterson pursuant to the February 18, 1993
letter agreement, except as to the $4,89 8.81 paid to
Guardian State Bank, which payments were secured under
clause (2) of the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II by reference to
paragraph 5 thereof.
(R. 1043-44.)

This holding of the district court is correct and

should be affirmed by this Court.
The monies advanced by defendant Peterson pursuant to the
February 18 Letter Agreement clearly constitute "additional loans
or advances."

The trust deed itself states that it secures

"payment of the indebtedness evidenced by a promissory note of
even date hereof in the principal sum of $95,000.00," i.e., the
Peterson Note.

The monies advanced pursuant to the February 18

Letter Agreement are thus subsequent and additional to that
original June 1991 note amount for purchase of the undeveloped
lot, and, as a matter of law, they are therefore "additional
loans" within the meaning of clause (3) of the trust deed.
2.

Clause (3) of the trust deed is not limited to
"unrelated" loans or advances.

In an effort to avoid the plain language of clause (3),
defendants argue that clause (3) "address[es] only new,
subsequent loans, unrelated in purpose to the amount originally
11

secured by the Trust Deed."
added).

Brief of Appellants at 16 (emphasis

But there is no such limiting language in clause (3) or

elsewhere in the trust deed.

Since neither the word "unrelated"

nor its concept can be found in clause (3) or in the trust deed,
defendants' argument on unrelatedness impermissibly seeks to
amend clause (3). 7
Defendants further argue that "the law is clear that later
advances are secured by an earlier trust deed or mortgage if
those advances are related to the same transaction as that
secured by the original instrument."

Brief of Appellants at 16.

For this sweeping legal proposition, defendants rely solely on
the case of First Security Bank of Utah v. Shiew, 609 P.2d 952
(Utah 1980).

Defendants' argument is flawed in multiple ways.

First, the defendants distort and misapply the Shiew case.
In Shiew, the Utah Supreme Court considered the "proper
interpretation" of a "dragnet clause" in a mortgage.
954.

609 P.2d at

The clause in that case was extremely broad and stated that

the mortgage was "'to secure any and all claims or demands now
due or to become due now or hereafter contracted or incurred
which the said mortgagee or the holder hereof, from time to time,
may have or hold against the mortgagors.""

Id. at 953.

There is

no such "dragnet clause" in the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II.
Indeed, the trust deed contains a provision that is directly

7

Even if defendants' argument were correct, the 1993
advances relate to the construction loan (Guardian State Bank)
and not to the Peterson Note for the purchase of the undeveloped
lot.
12

contrary to the one in Shiew.

Instead of covering "any and all

claims," the trust deed covers only promissory notes that
specifically refer to the trust deed and state that they are
secured by it.

Thus, Shiew has no applicability to this case.

Moreover, even if it were otherwise applicable, the only
effect of the Shiew decision is to reject securitization of
unrelated loans by a dragnet clause.

Shiew in no way suggests

that if a loan is related to a prior loan, it is secured despite
specific language in the trust deed to the contrary.
Further, not only is the Shiew decision inapplicable, the
defendant' own conduct demonstrates a construction of the trust
deed at odds with their current position.8

In the December 8

Agreement, by which defendant Peterson has previously agreed to
advance an additional $75,000, the parties included a specific
paragraph that provides:

"This Agreement is secured by a Trust

Deed dated June 21, 1991, more particularly referred to in
Paragraph 1 [sic] above."
Tab C.

December 8 Agreement, f 8; Addendum,

That agreement was drafted by counsel for defendant

Peterson.9

The only plausible purpose of that language would

have been no need to comply with clause (3) of the trust deed.
8

Under Utah law the subsequent conduct of the parties may be
referenced as a tool of interpretation. See Trucker Sales Corp.
v. Potter, 137 P.2d 370, 371-72 (Utah 1943); see also Eie v. St.
Benedict's Hosp.. 638 P.2d 1190, 1195 (Utah 1981).
defendants suggest that defendant Peterson was an
inexperienced person in business while Mr. Harrington was an
attorney. While this point has no legal significance, it is
misleading. Mrs. Peterson is the president of her own business
and was represented by counsel, Mr. Verhaaren, with respect to
that agreement.
13

If defendants' arguments on clauses (1) , (2), and (4) were
correct, there was no need for paragraph 8 in the December 8
Agreement.

The inclusion of that language by defendants then

contradicts their position now.
3.

Clauses (1), (2), and (4) of the trust deed do not
apply to the February 1993 advances.

Clauses (1), (2), and (4) of the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II
do not apply to the February 1993 advances made by Mrs. Peterson.
First, applying any of those clauses necessarily reads clause (3)
out of the agreement.

Second, by their own terms, clauses (1),

(2), and (4) have no application here.
A contract, such as a trust deed,10 must be construed so as
to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions.

See, e.g.,

Nielsen v. O'Reilly, 848 P.2d 664, 665 (Utah 1992); Minshew v.
Chevron Oil Co.. 575 P.2d 192, 194 (Utah 1978).

Defendants'

efforts to construe clauses (1), (2), and (4) to encompass an
advance that is both subsequent and additional to the original
loan impermissibly conflicts with clause (3)'s specific and
express applicability to "additional loans or advances hereafter
made."

Defendants' arguments thus would require a court to read

clause (3) out of the trust deed.

However, the law requires that

all four clauses be read in relation to each other and so as to
give effect to each.

Id.

The language of clause (3) is not only

plain and unambiguous, it is specific in its application to
10

Under Utah law, trust deeds are construed and interpreted
as contracts. See, e.g., Bank of Ephraim v. Davis, 559 P.2d 538,
540 (Utah 1977); see also 55 AM.JUR. 320, "Mortgages," § 175
(1971).
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"additional advances hereafter made."

That specific language

governs over the generalized interpretation that defendants try
to give to the other clauses of the trust deed.

See United Cal.

Bank v. Prudential Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 390, 425 (Ariz. Ct. App.
1983).
Further, clauses (1), (2), and (4) do hot apply on their
face to additional advances. Without any explanation or
authority, defendants assert that "Mrs. Peterson's later advances
are properly viewed as . . . a modification" of the original note
under clause (1). Brief of Appellants at 19. But, even without
clause (3), such an assertion is clearly erroneous, since
"modification" means some "alteration, adjustment or limitation"
to the original Note.
(1950).

See AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, p. 843

No such alteration, adjustment, or change ever occurred

to the Peterson Note or Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II.
Defendants next assert, citing clause (2) of the trust deed,
that the February 1993 advances "relate to the performance of
each of the provisions of the Trust Deed which the Trustor,
Harrington, agreed to perform."

Id.

Defendants then reference a

later provision of the trust deed, which they contend sets out
agreed-upon performance by the Trustor linking back to clause
(2).

The later provision, cited by defendants, states in part:
To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust, Trustor
Agrees:
1.
To keep said property in good condition and
repair; not to remove or demolish any building thereon; to
complete or restore promptly and in good and workmanlike
manner any building which may be constructed, damaged or
destroyed thereon; . . . to do all other acts which from the
15

character or use of said property may be reasonably
necessary, the specific enumerations herein not excluding
the general; and, if the loan secured hereby or any part
hereof is being obtained for the purpose of financing
construction of improvements on said property, Trustor
further agrees:
(a) to commence construction promptly and to pursue
same with reasonable diligence to completion in accordance
with plans and specifications satisfactory to Beneficiary,
and
(b) to allow Beneficiary to inspect said property at
all times during construction.
Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, p. 2; Addendum, Tab B.

Defendants

then argue, without explanation, that "because Mrs. Peterson's
advances fulfilled the performance of Harrington's obligations
under the Peterson Trust Deed, these advances are also secured by
the . . . Trust Deed under this second category."
Appellants at 19-20.
quoted paragraph.
its title:
."

Brief of

However, defendants clearly misread the

The purpose of the provision is set forth in

"To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust. . .

It is undisputed that the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II was given

to secure a purchase of raw land and not to secure a construction
loan; indeed, defendants repeatedly describe the trust deed as a
purchase money deed of trust.

Plaintiffs therefore could have no

obligation under the trust deed to maintain a structure or
complete construction on a structure that did not exist at the
time of the purchase.
In addition, paragraph 1 of the quoted language does not
apply to this loan because the Peterson Note was not a
construction loan.

Paragraph 1 states:

"if the loan secured

hereby or any part hereof is being obtained for the purpose of
16

financing construction of improvements on said property. Trustor
further agrees . . . to commence construction and to pursue same
with reasonable diligence to completion . . . ."
Trust Deed II, p. 2 (emphasis added).

Sunset Oaks

It is undisputed that the

Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II was not obtained "for the purpose of
financing construction."

Indeed, it was subordinated to the

first-position trust deed on the Sunset Oaks Property, which was
given to secure the Guardian State Bank construction loan.
Therefore, the performances argued for by defendants under clause
(2) are inapplicable to the Peterson Note, which was given to
purchase raw land and was indisputably not a construction loan.
Finally, defendants contend that clause (4) of the trust
deed collateralizes the February 1993 advances because the
advances were "sums expended or advanced . . . under or pursuant
to the terms" of the trust deed.

Citing paragraphs 7 and 8 of

the trust deed, defendants argue that defendant Peterson was
"apprehensive" about a premature sale of the property before
construction was substantially completed and that she therefore
"advanced further sums to complete construction" and improve the
potential of a maximum sales price.
21.

Brief of Appellants at 20-

Whatever may have been defendant Peterson's reasoning for

the advances, her motives do not convert or transform the nature
of the February 1993 advances from being an "additional loan or
advance" under clause (3) to a "sum advanced under or pursuant to
the terms of the Trust Deed" under clause (4).

17

This can be seen by examining the language of paragraphs 7
and 8, upon which defendants rely, which reads as follows:
To Protect the Security of this Deed of Trust. Trustor
Agrees:
•

*

*

(7) Should Trustor fail to make any payment or to do
any act as herein provided, then Beneficiary or, trustee but
without obligation so to do and without notice to or demand
upon Trustor and without releasing Trustor from any
obligation hereof, may: Make or do the same in such manner
and to such extent as either may deem necessary to protect
the security hereof, . . . and in exercising any such
powers, incur any liability, expend whatever* amounts in its
absolute discretion it may deem necessary therefor,
including cost of evidence of title, employ counsel, and pay
his reasonable fees.
(8) To pay immediately and without demand all sums
expended hereunder by Beneficiary or trustee, with interest
from date of expenditure at the rate of
percent per
annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured
hereby.
Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, p. 2; Addendum, Tab B (emphasis
added).

Contrary to defendants' assertion, paragraph 7 is not a

carte blanche authorization for the beneficiary to expend monies
as the Beneficiary deems necessary to protect the security.
Rather, it is expressly limited in its opening clause:

"Should

Trustor fail to make any payment or to do any act herein
provided. . . . "

(emphasis added).

In the event of such a

failure, the Beneficiary then and only then "may:

Make or do the

same in such manner . . . ," and have the trust deed as
collateral therefor.

Thus, Peterson was entitled to expend or

advance sums, within the meaning of clause (4), only if
Harrington failed to make a payment or do an act "herein
provided."

For example, if the Trustor (Harrington) failed "to
18

provide and maintain insurance" (1 2) or "to pay . . . all taxes
and assessments" (1 5 ) , then Peterson could step in and advance
those payments.
(1978).

See I SUMMARY OF UTAH PROPERTY LAW § 9.61

The February 1993 advances to complete construction of

the house, however, were clearly not "payments" or an "act"
provided for in the trust deed, and defendants point to no
specific predicate payment or act "under" the trust deed.

The

very same analysis applies to paragraph 8, since it relates to
"sums expended hereunder."
Thus, even if clause (3) did not specifically cover
additional advances and as a consequence control the analysis, on
the plain language of clauses (1), (2), and (4), defendants'
arguments fail as well.
4.

The district court properly rejected Peterson's
argument that she intended the advances to be
secured by the trust deed.

Defendants assert that Mrs. Peterson's "intent and
expectation" was that the February 1993 advances would be secured
by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, Brief of Appellants at 21, and
that she understood the February 18 Letter Agreement granted a
security interest in that trust deed.

Id. at 23.

Peterson apparently claims that the parties orally agreed to
secure her February 1993 advances with a deed of trust on the
Sunset Oaks Property.

First, there is no mention of any such

agreement or understanding in the February 18 Letter Agreement
itself.

Second, under Utah law, such oral agreements may not be

used to enforce monetary obligations against real property.
19

Therefore, the only agreement relative to the February 1993
advances properly before this Court is the February 18 Letter
Agreement.
Peterson's theoretical alleged oral agreement would
contravene the statute of frauds.

That statute provides as

follows:
No estate or interest in real property, other than
leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any trust or
power over or concerning real property or in any manner
relating thereto, shall be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or operation
of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by
the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering or
declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-1 (1995).

It is well settled that the

statute of frauds requires that "an agreement to secure an
obligation with real property" must be in writing.

Hector, Inc.

v. United Sav. & Loan Ass'n. 741 P.2d 542, 546 (Utah 1987).
B,

The District Court Correctly Ruled that the February 18
Letter Agreement Does Not Meet the Requirements of
Clause (3).

As demonstrated above, the district court correctly held
that this case is governed by clause (3) of the trust deed.
Turning to the application of clause (3), the district court
correctly ruled that the requirements of clause (3) were not met.
The trust deed makes clear in clause (3) that "additional
loans or advances" to the trustor are secured by the trust deed
only "when evidenced by a promissory note or notes reciting that
they are secured by that Deed of Trust."
requirements:

Thus, there are two

1) there must be a promissory note, and 2) the
20

promissory note must state that it is secured by the Sunset Oaks
Trust Deed II.

As shown below, neither requirement is satisfied

here.
•.-!•••

The only document setting forth the parties'
agreement regarding the February 1993 advances is
the February 18 Letter Agreement.

The district court held:
The Court finds that the February 18, 1993 letter from
Robert L. Harrington to Marilyn Hamilton Peterson is the
only document which reflects the agreement between the
parties with respect to the advances made by defendant
Peterson after those covered by the December 8, 1992
Agreement.
(R. 1044.)

Defendants do not challenge this finding on appeal.

Therefore, the only question is whether the February 18 Letter
Agreement constitutes a promissory note that recites that it is
secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II.
2.

The February 18 Letter Agreement is not a
promissory note.

Although the district court did not decide whether the
February 18 Letter Agreement constitutes a promissory note, it is
clear that it does not, and this Court may affirm the decision of
the district court for any reason.11
As stated above, the only written agreement memorializing or
reflecting defendant Peterson's loan of the $69,626 in February
1993 is the February 18 Letter Agreement.

That agreement

provides that "the sale of the house will be the sole source of
the return of this money."

It contains no promise to pay by HPI

"See Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895
(Utah 1988) .
21

or Harrington.

Thus, the letter agreement is not a promissory

note, since there is no personal or corporate promise to pay the
loan-

See, e.g.. In re Cochise College Park, Inc., 703 F.2d

1339, 1347 (9th Cir. 1983) ("A 'promissory note' is itself merely
'a promise or engagement, in writing, to pay a specified sum at a
time therein limited . . . to a person therein named, or to his
order, or bearer.'", citing Black's Law Dictionary 1093); see
also Utah Code Ann. § 70A-3-104(5) (1997).
The February 18 Letter Agreement is clear and unambiguous on
its face.

It reads in its entirety as follows:

This letter will confirm that any money advanced by
you, above and beyond the $75,000 (December 8, 1992
Agreement), for the purpose of construction of the home
located at 1656 South Sunset Oaks Dr., will be returned to
you with interest consistent with the rate of interest in
our Agreement dated December 8, 1992, and will be returned
to you prior to the distribution of any proceeds to
Harrington Properties, Inc. The sale of the house will be
the sole source of the return of this money.
Tab 4.

Significantly, defendants did not ever request

preparation of a promissory note for the monies advanced in 1993
or of any document reciting that the additional loans were
secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II. The reason for that
failure is obvious--the February 18 Letter Agreement did not
contemplate or provide for it.
3.

The February 18 Letter Agreement does not recite
that it is secured by the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed
II.

Finally, the February 18 Letter Agreement does not recite
that the February 1993 advances are secured by the Sunset Oaks
Trust Deed II. Thus, whether or not the February 18 Letter
22

Agreement can be construed to be a promissory note, it is clear,
as a matter of law, that it does not comply with the requirements
of clause (3) of the trust deed.
Defendants nevertheless argue that the February 18 Letter
Agreement "should properly be viewed as the equivalent of both a
promissory note and a grant of security interest."
Appellants at 23.

Brief of

For purposes of their security interest

argument, defendants rely solely on the last sentence of the
letter agreement's first paragraph, which states:' "The sale of
the house will be the sole source of the return of this money."
Defendants then argue that "any lay person reading that sentence
would understand that language to be the equivalent of a grant of
a security interest in the property, which is the subject of the
Deed of Trust. . . . "

Id.

However, defendants completely misread that sentence, since
it nowhere references either a security interest or the Sunset
Oaks Trust Deed II.

Specifically that sentence does not "recite"

or otherwise reference in any possible way that the advances "are
secured by [the Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II]." Indeed, the last
sentence means just what it states, that Peterson may only look
to the proceeds from the sale of the house for the return of this
money and not to Harrington personally or to the property.12

12

Even if defendants were correct that the last sentence
created a security interest in the Sunset Oaks Property, at most
it would be an independent security interest with its own
priority, and not tied back to the trust deed.
23

Thus, the February 18 Letter Agreement does not comply in any
sense with clause (3) of the Trust Deed.
In a strained effort to satisfy the requirements of clause
(3) , defendants next argue that the February 1983 Letter
Agreement incorporates the December 8 Agreement.

Defendants

suggest that the December 8 Agreement and the February 18 Letter
Agreement jointly "memorialize the parties' understanding and
agreement" on later advances.

Brief of Appellants at 22.

However the February 18 Letter Agreement does not incorporate or
join in the December 8 Agreement.

The February 18 Letter

Agreement specifically references only one portion of the
December 8 Agreement, namely, that "any money advanced . . . will
be returned to you with interest consistent with the rate of
interest in our Agreement dated December 8, 1992 . . . ." Under
principles of construction, "[a] reference in a contract to
another document will incorporate the other document only to the
extent indicated and for the specific purpose indicated."
Prichard v. Clay, 780 P.2d 359, 361-62 (Alaska 1989) ("Parties do
not undertake obligations contained in a separate document unless
their contract clearly says so."); Accord:

United Cal. Bank v.

Prudential Ins. Co., 681 P.2d 390, 411 (Ariz. App. 1983).

In the

February 18 Letter Agreement, the sole reference to the December
8 Agreement is to the interest term.

Thus, the December 8

Agreement is incorporated and applicable only to the extent
indicated, i.e., the interest term.
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This plain reading of the February 18 Letter Agreement is
confirmed by the fact that the letter agreement contains two
substantive terms that are also found in the December 8
Agreement.

As a logical matter, addressing those substantive

terms would be unnecessary if the December 8 Agreement were
incorporated therein.

First, the February i8 Letter Agreement

states that any money advanced "will be returned to you prior to
the distribution of any proceeds to Harrington Properties, Inc."
That provision has a similar objective to paragraph 2 of the
December 8 Agreement, which provides:

" . . . all funds advanced

by Peterson . . . shall only be used to pay for the Work and for
no other purpose," i.e., no payments to Harrington.

Second, the

February 18 Letter Agreement provides that "the sale of the house
will be the sole source of the return of this money."

By

comparison, paragraph 4 of the December 8 Agreement provides:
"Peterson's sole recourse to recover the sums of money advanced
by her under . . . this Agreement . . . shall be against the
Property and/or the proceeds arising from its sale or transfer."
If, as defendants suggest, the February 18 Letter Agreement
incorporates the December 8 Agreement, inclusion of such terms as
well as the interest would be completely superfluous.

Thus, the

plain language of the February 18 Letter Agreement belies
Peterson's contention and demonstrates that there is no general
incorporation of the December 8 Agreement,

25

II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT NO INTEREST RAN ON
THE PETERSON NOTE PRIOR TO FEBRUARY 24, 1994.
Defendants also challenge the district court's order of

partial summary judgment determining that no interest ran on the
Peterson Note prior to February 24, 1994, the date on which the
Sunset Oaks Property sold.
of $95,000.

That note was in a principal amount

In the two places for an interest term to be

inserted in the form note, the Peterson Note as signed stated
"N/A."

The district court concluded, and defendants now concede,

that language unambiguously provided for no interest to run prior
to any default.
The default interest blanks in the Peterson Note were also
not filled in.13

The Peterson Note provided: "Balance due in

nine months from date of execution."

The December 8 Agreement

between the parties unambiguously amended the due date for
payment of the Peterson Note to the date the property was sold
(February 24, 1994).

Based on that ambiguous amendment, the

district court held that the note thus was not in default prior
to February 24, 1994.

The district court also held that the

December 8 Agreement made clear that no interest ran or was to be
paid on the note until it was due.

As more fully explained

below, the district court's decision was correct and should be
affirmed.
13

Defendants argue that the default rate of interest on the
note should be the statutory 10% rate because the interest rate
was left blank in the default provisions of the note. Plaintiffs
did not contest below that the statutory 10% rate would apply to
the blank interest term in the default section of the note if
that section of the note were to apply.
26

A.

Under Utah Law, the Construction of Unambiguous
Contracts is a Matter of Law,

The determination of defendants' issue requires construction
of the December 8 Agreement.

"The interpretation of a contract

is a matter of law for the court to determine unless the contract
is ambiguous and evidence of the parties' intent (which is a
matter of fact) is necessary to establish the terms of the
contract."

Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 200 (Utah 1991).

See also Willard Pease Oil & Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co.,
899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995).14
B.

The Peterson Note Unambicruously Provides That Interest
is not Applicable.

The Peterson Note was executed by the parties on July 21,
1991.

In the relevant portion of the Peterson Note, which is a

form note with blanks to be filled in, there are two blanks
relating to interest, one for the amount of interest on the
principal balance to be spelled out and another in parenthesis
for it to be typed in numerical form.
abbreviation "N/A" was typed in.
applicable."

In both places, the

"N/A" unambiguously means "not

These two specific entries on the note demonstrate

that the parties specifically agreed that interest would not be
applicable to the $95,000 dollar principal balance in the
Peterson Note.

"Defendants themselves cite authority for the same
proposition that "the intent of the parties is to be determinea
from the writing itself" and that a court will not "look beyond
the wording of the agreement to determine the parties intent."
Brief of Appellants at 29 (citing cases).
27

Defendants set forth certain alleged facts relating to the
history of negotiations leading up to and surrounding the
execution of the Peterson Note.
26.

Brief of Appellants at 14, 24-

However, such arguments are improper given the unambiguous

statement that interest is not applicable.
Defendants do "not now claim[] interest for the time before
the Peterson Note came due in March 1992. "15
at 14.

Brief of Appellants

However, defendants do claim that on and after March 21,

1992, the original due date, the Peterson Note was in default and
that default interest applied from March 21, 1992, forward, even
15

By this position, defendants concede and acknowledge that
interest on the principal balance of the note did not apply or
accrue between the date of the note's execution and the original
due date of March 21, 1992. Defendants necessarily recognize
that the "N/A" interest term is clear, unambiguous, and not
susceptible to any attack. Even if defendants sought to vary the
term of the Peterson Note relating to interest from "N/A" to
"10%" by relying on contemporaneous alleged documents or oral
discussions, that effort would be barred by the parol evidence
rule because the "N/A" term is not ambiguous, an essential
condition to avoid the parol evidence rule. E.g., E.A. Strout W,
Realty Agency v. Broderick. 522 P.2d 144, 145 (Utah 1974).
Defendants cite the case of Union Bank v. Swenson, 707 P.2d 663
(Utah 19 85), for the proposition that extrinsic evidence is
"admissible on the threshold issue of whether [a] writing was
adopted by the parties as an integration of their agreement
. . . ." Brief of Appellants at 26 n.3. However, defendants do
not thereafter assert that the Peterson Note was not an
integrated contract. In fact, the Peterson Note was the "final
expression" of the parties' agreement on the trust deed note,
especially as to the "N/A" interest term. The Peterson Note was
executed simultaneously with the Warranty Deed and Deed of Trust,
which merged or integrated any prior contracts for conveyance.
Dobruskv v. Isbell. 740 P.2d 1325, 1326 (Utah 1987). Accord:
Espinoza v. Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979)
(extinguishing prior earnest money agreement). No subsequent
claim was made by defendant Peterson that the interest term of
the Peterson Note was in error or was not a final expression,
which precludes their raising it on appeal now. Finally, the
Peterson Note was treated as a final expression in the December 8
Agreement.
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after the due date amendment in the December 8 Agreement.

As

discussed below, that position is contradicted by the due date
amendment and other terms of the December 8 Agreement.
C.

The December 8 Agreement Unambiguously Modifies the Due
Date of the Peterson Note Without Modifying the
Interest Term,

The December 8 Agreement addressed the"delays in the
anticipated construction and the need for additional monies to
finish construction.

The December 8 Agreement provided that

defendant Peterson would advance up to $75,000 in additional
monies, subject to certain terms and conditions.

The agreement

also addressed payment of the $95,000 Peterson Note, and extended
the due date on that note to the time of the sale of the
property.

In doing so, the December 8 Agreement did not in any

way provide for any interest, default or otherwise, to run on the
original note.
Paragraph 4 of the December 8 Agreement, which specifically
addresses these issues, reads as follows:
Payment of the sum owed by Harrington under the terms
of the original Trust Deed Note ($95,000) and payment of the
sums advanced by Peterson under the terms of this Agreement
(not to exceed an additional $75,000) shall be due on the
date the property is sold by the Owner or is otherwise
transferred, conveyed or assigned.
The parties agree that Peterson's sole recourse to
recover the sums of money advanced by her under the terms of
this Agreement, plus interest and attorneys' fees, and to
recover the sum of Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000)
owed to her under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note,
shall be against the Property and/or the proceeds arising
from its sale or transfer.
December 8 Agreement, 1 4, Addendum, Tab C.
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The first sentence of paragraph 4 provides that both the
original Peterson Note and the new monies advanced under the
December 8 Agreement "shall be due on the date the property is
sold by Owner."

That sentence clearly and unambiguously extends

the "due date" for the Peterson Note to the date of closing, an
express modification of the nine-month due date in the Peterson
Note.

Thus, interest on that note was "not applicable" until the

due date of the sale of the Sunset Oaks Property, i.e., February
24, 1994.
In addition, the December 8 Agreement does not amend the
Peterson Note to bear ongoing interest nor otherwise suggest that
interest runs on the note.
no interest component.

To the contrary, it affirms there is

That interest is "not applicable" in the

Peterson Note is affirmed by the second part of paragraph 4,
which provides that Mrs. Peterson's sole recourse is to recover:
. . . the sums of money advanced by her under the terms
of this Agreement, plus interest and attorneys' fees, and to
recover the sum of Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000)
(emphasis added).

Id.

This sentence specifically mentions

interest on the monies advanced under the December 8 Agreement
but omits any reference to interest on the $95,000 Peterson Note.
The omission of reference to interest on the $95,000 Note, when
interest is specifically referenced with respect to the new
monies advanced pursuant to the December 8 Agreement, confirms
that no interest on the Peterson Note was contemplated by the
parties.
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Notwithstanding that the due date for the Peterson Note was
amended by the December 8 Agreement to the date of the property
sale, defendants argue that default interest from March 21, 1992,
to December 8, 1992, continued to be owed by Harrington because
the December 8 Agreement did not explicitly forgive or excuse it.
Brief of Appellants at 28.

Defendants argue that

fl

[a]bsent some

sort of express additional language clarifying that merely
postponing the payment date was also meant to excuse interest on
a long-overdue obligation, such intention should 'not be read into
the clear language of the document."16

Id. at 28.

Defendants'

position is wrong on several grounds.
First, the December 8 Agreement amended the "due date" of
the Peterson Note.

Thus, the note, as amended, was not and could

not be in default until the end of its term, namely, the sale of
the property.

As a logical matter, it is impossible for the

Peterson Note to have a due date in the future and also be in
default.

For that reason, there was no need for the parties to

"excuse" any default interest once the note was amended.17
16

Defendants contended before the district court that default
interest applied even after the amendment of the due date in the
December 8 Agreement since they asked that court for a
declaration that "interest does accrue on the $95,000 of the
original Peterson Note from March 21, 1992 forward."
(R. at
1087.)
17

Defendants argue that the December 8 Agreement was silent
on the issue of excusing the prior default interest and that such
silence should not be presumed to eliminate such interest.
Defendants cite no authority for that presumption and are wrong.
First, as discussed herein, the December 8 Agreement is not
silent on the issue of any prior default interest because it
expressly states that the sum payable on the amended due date is
$95,000. Second, even if the December 8 Agreement was "silent",
31

Second, in amending the due date of the Peterson Note,
paragraph 4 of the December 8 Agreement is explicit on the amount
to be paid on the amended due date.

Paragraph 4 reads:

"Payment

of the sum owed by Harrington under the terms of the original
Trust Deed Note ($95,000) . . . shall be due on the date the
Property is sold . . . ."

This language is clear and unambiguous

that the amount to be paid on the due date was $95,000, not
$95,000 plus default or other interest.
Third, defendants assert that paragraph 3 of the December 8
Agreement, which contains at the end of the first sentence the
phrase, "plus accruing interest," indicates that interest was
already then accruing on the Peterson Note.

Brief of Appellants

at 27. Once again, defendants' argument misreads the language of
the referenced paragraph.

That paragraph reads:

3. Obligation of Harrington and Owner: In addition to the
payment of the sum of Ninety Five Thousand Dollars
($95,000.00) owed to her on the original Trust Deed Note
dated June 21, 1991, Peterson shall be entitled to the
payment of all sums advanced by her pursuant to the terms of
this Agreement together with attorney fees incurred by her
relating in any way to the negotiations for and preparation
of this Agreement, plus accruing interest. Interest on the
unpaid balance of each sum advanced by Peterson pursuant to
paragraph 1 above shall be calculated from the date each sum
has been advanced by her until she had been repaid in full
at the prime rate then charged by Valley Bank and Trust
Company plus four (4) percentage points.
December 8 Agreement, ^ 3 (emphasis added); Addendum, Tab C.
phrase, "plus accruing interest," can only be read as applying
solely to new monies advanced for several reasons. The
the more reasonable inference from such silence is that the
amended due date eliminated any default status and interest
related thereto.
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The

introductory phrase, "[i]n addition to," clarifies that the new
monies being advanced pursuant to the agreement are "in addition"
to the original $95,000.

Everything after "June 21, 1991," in

that first sentence then addresses the new monies advanced
pursuant to the agreement, i.e., the $75,000. The phrase, "plus
accruing interest," applies to the new monies advanced pursuant
to the Agreement because it is placed at the end of the sentence
in conjunction with the concept of "sums advanced . . . pursuant
to the terms of this Agreement."

It is simply a 'strained and

unwarranted reading to apply it to the $95,000 mentioned at the
first of the sentence.
Defendants also suggest that the phrase, "plus accruing
interest," must be read as "signif[ying] that interest was
already then accruing . . . ."

Id.

However, that phrase is

better read to refer to interest which accrues in the future on
monies advanced under the agreement, which in fact makes more
sense in the context of the entire paragraph.
Finally, and most persuasively, the phrase, "plus accruing
interest," is further clarified by the second sentence of
paragraph 3, which describes the amount of the interest referred
to in the preceding sentence and how it shall be calculated as to
"the unpaid balance of each sum advanced by Peterson pursuant to
paragraph 1 above . . . "

Since paragraph 1 of the agreement

refers only to the new monies to be advanced not to exceed
$75,000, it confirms that interest does not apply to the Peterson
Note.
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This reading of the December 8 Agreement is confirmed by the
second sentence of paragraph 4, which reads as follows:
The parties agree that Peterson's sole recourse to recover
the sums of money advanced by her under the terms of this
Agreement, plus interest and attorney fees, and to recover
the sum of Ninety Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000.00) owed to
her under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note, shall
be against the property and/or the proceeds arising from its
sale or transfer.
December 8 Agreement, ^ 4 (emphasis added); Addendum, Tab C.

The

placement of the phrase, "plus interest," after the reference to
"sums of money advanced by her under the terms of this Agreement"
and before the reference to the original trust deed note can only
be read as indicating that interest was to run on the sums
advanced under the agreement but not on the trust deed note.

The

word, "and," following the reference to interest makes clear that
interest applies only to the sums advanced under the agreement.
Thus, the second sentence of paragraph 4 supports the
interpretation that no interest ran on the Peterson Note.
The December 8 Agreement clearly and unambiguously amended
the due date of the Peterson Note, and that note could not be in
default until the amended due date accrued.

The December 8

Agreement further recognized that no default or other interest
had accrued or would accrue on the Peterson Note.
III.

PLAINTIFFS ARE ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEYS1 FEES.
Plaintiffs seek an award of their attorneys' fees on appeal.

Plaintiffs are entitled to recovery of their attorneys' fees with
respect to defendants' wrongful claim that the Sunset Oaks Trust
Deed II secured the February 1993 advances and thus was in
34

default by that amount.

Paragraph 19 of the trust deed provides

for a "recover[y]" of a "reasonable attorney's fee" in the event
of "any default hereunder."

Addendum, Tab B.

Pursuant to Utah

Code Annotated Section 78-27-56.5 (1986), plaintiffs have a
reciprocal right of recovery as the prevailing party for disputes
under the trust deed.
With respect to the interest issue, which involves
interpretation of the December 8 Agreement on the amendment of
the due date, paragraph 6 of that agreement provides that
defendant Peterson "shall be entitled to" recover all costs
incurred in enforcing the terms hereof, including reasonable
attorneys' fees . . . ."

Under the statutory principle of

-reciprocal rights, plaintiffs would be entitled to recover their
attorneys' fees if they prevail.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the
declaratory judgment of the district court.
DATED this

^7

day of March, 1998.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
/

James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
Eric D. Barton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on the Z7•A day of March, 1998, I have
caused to be hand-delivered two true and correct copies of the
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEES to the following:
Harold C. Verhaaren, Esq.
John K. Mangum, Esq.
NIELSEN & SENIOR
60 East South Temple, #1100
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
DATED this

^7

day of March, 1998.
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER

James S. Jardine
Brent D. Wride
Eric D. Barton
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellees
0267661.01
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ADDENDUM
A.

Peterson Note, dated June 21, 1991

B.

Sunset Oaks Trust Deed II, dated June 21, 1991

C.

December 8 Agreement.

D.

February 18 Letter Agreement
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NOTE

DO NOT DESTROY THIS NOTE: When paid, this note# with Trust Deed securing same, mist
be surrendered to Trustee for cancellation, before reconveyance will be made.

$95,000.00

BAIT LAKE CITY,
_J\me 21, 1991

FDR VAIUE RECEIVED, the undersigned, jointly and severally, promise to pay to the order of
MARILVK HAMimaN PETERSON

NINETY FIVE TH3U3AHD DOLLARS AND 00 CENTS

DOLLARS ( $95,000.00 )

together with interest f ran date at the rate of
N/A
_ ^ _
per cent ( N/A
%) per annum on the unpaid principal, said
principal and interest payable as follows:
BAIANCE DUE 9 MDNTKB FROM DATE OF EXECUTION

A late payment penalty of
percent (
%) of any payment due
shall be assessed against the Maker if said payment has not been received by Holder
within
days of the due date. Each payment shall be credited first to late
payments due, then to accrued Interest due and the remainder to principal.
If default occurs in the payment of said installments of principal and interest or
any part thereof, or in the perfcmanoe of any agreement contained in the Trust Deed
securing this note, the holder hereof, at its option and without notice or demand,
may declare the entire principal balance and aocrued interest due and payable.
Maker hereby acknowledges and agrees that the interest rate shall be accelerated
to
percent (
%) per annum on the unpaid balance at the time of
default.
If this note is collected by an attorney after default in the payment of principal
or interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned, jointly and severally agree
to pay all costs and expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The nakers, sureties, guarantors, and endorsers hereof severally waive presentiment
for payment, demand and notice of dishonor and nonpayment of this note, and consent
to any and all extensions of time, renewals, waivers or mcdifications that may
^) ^ O
be granted by the holder hereof with respect to the navment or othar nrovieions of
^

ui4x» note, anp to uia release or any security, or any part tftereof, with or without
substitution.
Ihis note is secured by a Trust Deed of even date herewith.

ROBERT L. HARRUDTON

102415

40
CATC Rev.6-87)

~L(*

TabB

<°
\\

7^^
•Jt.
GO
CD
CD

IO

/njzLHdZ.

5 0 8 8 8 1 5
27 JUHE 91
(HI55 Pfl
KATIE
L .
DIXON
RECORDER, SALT LAKE COWTTt UTAH
ASSOCIATED TITLE
R£C BYi KAttM BLANCHMW) i OEPCTY

**ACi AlOVt TMlt LINC fOt ttCOtOCft't U1C.

(tpaca Above Thla l\rm for Recording Oetel
DEED OF TRUST
WITH XfiSXGHKSKT OP RENTS

TKU OCCO Of TRUST, mm* ttila

21

d»y of

June

1 9 9 1 r«tween .

a« T t U \ f O t , taVeo addreee la .

ASSOCIATED TITLE OCKPANY
MnRILW IfAMIUXy PETERSON
VlUCSSCSt

, o Utah corporation, oa TRUSTEE, and .
_, aa KttflCIARv,

That Trustor COMVtYt AMD UAltANTS TO TRUSTEE U TRUST, VtTM fOWCt Of SALE, the following described

property, attuatad lr. fff\LT IAFR

County, Stata of Utah:

IiTT 1 7 , SUKSET OAKS SUBDIVISION PIAT "B H , AO00RDIM3 TO THE OFFICIAL PLAT
THEREOF ON FILE AND OF REOCCD IN THE SALT LAKE OOUNIY RECORDER'S OFFICE.

Tooather with all buUdlne*, flsturea and < < y w « a n t a tharaon and a l l water rights, rights of way, easeaants, rants,
issues, prrfna, tncaaa, tam—nta, heredltMamts, privileges and appurtanancaa thereunto belonging, now or haraafter
used or onjoyed with Mid prooerty, or any pert thereof, 3JIJCCT,flQUEVER,to tha right, power and authority
hereinafter given to and conferred upon leneficUry to collet t and apply such rents. Issues, and prof It J.
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for the Purpose of securing:
(1)

P*imf*

ef the fndeotednees evidenced by * proaleeory note of even data hereof I n the principal eua af

S$95,000.00

, aad* by T r u s t e r , payable to the order of t e n a f l c l o r y at tho t i e * * . I n the v a m i r

and with I n t e r e s t a* t h e r e i n t a t f o r t h , and any oxtanoiona and/or renewals or Modification* thereof;
(2)

the perforeence of each a i r • — a n t of Trustor heroin contafnad;

(3)

tha psyasnt of ouch additional loam or

advances ao h«raaftar aay be aede to Truster, or M a sueceeeora or aeelgns, whan evidenced by a promissory nota or
nota* r e c i t i n g that thay mr% secured by t h l a i e e d of Trust; and

<4>

tha payee/* of a l l sues expended or edvenced

by l e m ' i c l a r y under or pureuent t a tho :ar«a h«r-«of, together with Intaraat tharaon a t herein provided.
To Protect Tha Security of Thla Oeed of Trust, T u t t e r Agrees:
1.

To kaap said proparty I n food condition and r e p a i r ; not to reaove or deaolish any building tharaon; to

coapleta or reetore promptly and I n food ard workmanlike aurrtar any b u t l d l r i which M y ba constructed, daaeged or
destroyed tharacn; to cnaply with a l l l a c e , covenants a d r e s t r i c t i o n s a f f e c t i n g aald property; not to coanit or
pa r a i t waste tharaof; not to cecal t , euffer rtr permit any act uron aald proparty In v i o l a t i o n of law; to do a l l othar
acta Mhlch f r e a tha character or use of aald p r u p t r t r aey ba reasonably necMAary, tha apaclflc enuaeretlons Kara In
not excluding tha general; and. I f tha loan secured haroby or any part haraof fa being obtainad for the purpose af
financing construction of laprovaaunta on aald proparty Trustor f u r t h a r egreeet
(a)

To cnaaanco conetruction proaptly and to pursue seee t i l t h reasonable diligence to coaplttlon I n accordanca
with plena and apaclf I c a t ! ana s a t i s f a c t o r y to b e n e f i c i a r y , and

<b)

To a l i o * i a n a f l c l a r y t o tncpact aald proparty at o i l t l a e s during construction.

T r u t t a a , upon praaantatlon t o I t of a t a f f i d a v i t t l f n a d by t a n a f U l e r y , s e t t i n g f o r t * facts shoving s ds'wult
by Trustor under t h i s rvncaered paragraph, la author! tad to ace apt as trua and concluaiva a l l facts 9ird ststeeents
t h e r e i n , and to act tharaon hereunder.
2.

To prcvida and a e i n t e i n insurance, of such typa or typas and Mounts as tancf I c l a r y as * require, on tha

tsproveaente now existing or haraaftar aractad or placad on said proparty.

Such Insuranca shall ba carried In

cenpeniee approved by i a n a f l c l a r y , who aey M k e proof of loaa, and aach inauranca coapany concerned Is h«raby
author I rod and diractad t > aake peyaent for such loco d t r a c t l y to i a n a f l c l a r y , instaad of te Trustor and H e m f l e i a r y
J o i n t l y , and tha Inauranca proceeda. or any part tharaof, aay ba appllad by i a n a f l c l a r y , at I t s option, to tha
reduction of tha Indebtedieec haraby aacurad or to r a a t o r a t l o n or rapair of tha proparty damaged.

I n tha »vent

that tha Trustor shall f a i l t a provids a a t l s f a c t o r y fcatsrd Inauranca, tha i e n e f i c l e r y aay procure, on tha Trustor's
bahalf, Inauranca In favor af tha i a n a f l c l a r y elene.

If

Inauranca cenrm ba aacurad by tha Trustor to provide tha

required coverage, t h i s w i l l conatltuta an act of d e f a u l t undar tha tanas of Peed of T r u s t .

S.

To dattvar t o , pay for and m Int a I n with i a n a f l c l a r y u n t i l tna Indebtedness aacurad haraby 1s peid in f u l l ,

such evidence of t l t l a m i a n a f l c l a r y aay r e q u i r e , including abstracts of t i t l a or p o l i c i e s of t i t l e ireurince and
any txteneione er ronewala tharaof or eupplaeeots that J t o .
4.

To appaar I n and defand any action or proceeding purporting to a f f e c t tha security haraof, tha t i t l e t i said

property, or the r i g h t s or powers of i a n a f l c l a r y or Trvatee; and should i a n a f l c l a r y or Trustee elect to appaar i n or
defend any such action or proceeding, to pay a l l costs and expjnees, Including cost of evidence of t i t l a and
attorney's fees I n a reasonable sua Incurred by i a n a f l c l a r y or Trustee.
5.

To pay at least 10 days before delinquency a l l taxae and Mneeaovnts off acting sold property. Including

a l l Msessajents upon water coapsny stock and a l l r a n t s , eeeeesaents and charges for water, oppurtensnt to or used '.n
connection with r a i d property; to pay, when due, a l l encumbrances, charges, oral llano with I n t e r e s t , on ssld property
or any part thereof, whlcN at any l i e * eppecr to ba p r i o r or superior hereto; to pay a l l costs, fees, and expense*
of t h i s Trust.
a.

To pay to I a n a f l c l a r y aunchty I r advance, m\ aaount, as eat I rated by i e n a f l c i a r y i n I t s discretion,

• u f i t c i w Y t to pay » U tsxet e«d • • • • • • r e n t e a f f e c t i n g aald property, and a l l preoluas on Insurance therefor, at ard

when t*e M M shall becoma due.
7.

Should Trustor f a l l ta sake any r e i e a n t er t e do any act as herein provided, then l e n e f i c i a r y cr. Trustee

but without o b l i g a t i o n so ta do and without notice to or dewwnd upon Trustor and without releestr-) Trustor froa ery
obligation hereof, swtyi

Make ar do the aaaa I n ouch awrnar and to such extant as e i t h e r aay deaa necessary to

protect the security hereof, i a n a f l c l a r y or Trustee being authorised to enter upon aald property for such pur>o*eft;
c o M a n u , appeur I n and defend any action or proceed I re. purporting t o a f f e c t tha security hereof or the r i r ; * t t e*
powers af i a n a f l c l a r y or Trustee; pay, purrjteee, cent e a t , or coaproalaa any e/wuebrence, charge or l i e n unlch in the
Jud^nant af e i t h e r eppee-e to ba ar 1 t * or mjp9r\t

h e r e t o ; mrd I n exercising any such powers, incur any I t a L l i i t y ,

aipand whatever aaourKS if. I t s abeeiwte d l a e r a t i o n I t aay deea necMssry t h e r e f o r . Including cost of evidence of
t i t l e , eaploy counael, end pay b i s reeeonabU f e e s .
I.

To pay I n s o d U u l f and %\XtiM\

frca data of expenditure at the r a t a of

££)
^

daaarsj g l l sum s upended htftvndcr by l e m f l c l t r y or T r u s i n , with i n u r e s I
X per annua u n t i l p a i d , and tha repayaent thereof shall t» secured

hereby.

^
^ i
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t. To pay to tenef Ulery a "late charge- of not to exceed fire cent* (5) for each One Dollar (St.00) of **ch
peyaent eua hereunder or oVt pursuant to the aforoeald prosriesory note of even data hereof which fa aore than
fifteen <15> deye In err JSIV . This p a y n t ahall be eade to cover the extra expenee Involved In hendltnf delinquent
peyasnts.

IT II MJTUVU.IT AOCE0 T M T I
10.

Could e«ld property or any part thereof be taken or da—aed by reaeon of any public layroe—nt or

condeanetion proceeding, or do—god by fire, or earthquake, or In any other earner, teneficlary ahall be entitled to
ail coapenaatlon, awards, and other peyasnts or relief therefor, and ahall be entitled at fta option to coaasence,
eppeer in and proaecute in Ita own none, any action or proceedings, or to •ate any coaproaisc or settlement. In
comectlcn with ouch taking or daaeai. All auch cowpervation, awarda, dosages, rights of action and proceoda,
including the proceoda of any policies of fire and other Insurance effecting eaid property, ere hereby assigned to
teneflciary, who oey, after deducting therefroa all ita expenses. Including attorney's feet, apply the seae on any
indebtedness secured hereby.

True tor afreee to execute auch further aaaionoenta of any coapenaatlon, award, daaoces,

and rights of action and procetda aa tenef iclary or Trustee aey require.

11.

At any tie* and fro* tie* to tiae upon written requMt of tenef (clary, peyaent of its feee and presentation

of thia Deed of Trust and the note for endorsement <in case of full ^conveyance, for cancellation and retention}
without affecting the 11 ability of any peraon for the peyaant of the Indebtedness accurod hereby, and without
releeeing the interest of any party Joining in this Deed of TriaC, Tnxtee ray (a) conaent to the asking of any cap
or plat of said property; (b) Join in fronting any eeseaent or creating any restrict I on thereon; (c) Join in any
eubordlnation or other ograaaant affecting thia Deed of Trust or the lien or charge thereof; « D grcit any externion
or aodif(cation of the teres of thia loan; (e) r«convey, without warranty, all or any part of M i d property.

The

grantee In any reconveyance any be dot ylbod ae "the peraon or persons entitled thereto", and the recitals therein
of eny aatters or facta ahall bo conclusive proof of the truthfulness thereof.

Truster agrees to pay reasonable

trustee's feee for any of the services aantiomd In this paragraph.
12.

Aa additional aecurity. Trustor hereby assigns to lenafIclary, during the continuance of these trusts,

all r^nts, Issues, royalties, and profits of the property affected by \ M e Oeed of Trust and of any personal property
located thereon.

Until Trustor ahall default in the peyaant of any Indebtedness accurod hereby or In the perforaance

of any agreeaant hereunder, Truster ahall have the right to collect all „uch rents. Issues, royalties, and profits
Mi-ned prior to default M

they beooae due and payable.

If Trustor ahall default ae aforesaid, Trustor's right to

collect any of auch aoneyn shall ce%sc and l « w f iclary ahall have the right, with or without taking possession of
the property affected hereby, to collect all rente, revolt lee. Issues, and profits,
tent (Id try of the right, power, and authority Co collect the aaae.

failure or discontinuance of

lothirg contained herein, nor the exerciee of

th< right by teneflciary to collect, ahall be, or be construed to be, an aff treat ion by teneflciary of any tenancy,
lease or option, nor an eoeuaptlan of liability undar, nor a subordination of the lien or charge of this Deed of
Trust to any auch tenancy, loose or option.

13.

upon any default by Trustor hereunder, tenefIclary cay at any tiro without notice, either In person, by

egent, or by a receiver to be appointed by a court (Trustor hereby consenting to the appointaent of teneflciary as
such receiver), •* j without regard to the adrquacy of any aecurity for the indebtedness hereby secured, enter upon
and take possession of M i d property or eny part theroof. In its O O T naat sue for or otherwise collect said rents,
issues, and profits, including those peat dje and unpaid, trti

apply the ease, lest costs and expenses of operation

and collection. Including reasonable attorneya fees, upon any indebtedness secured hereby, and in auch order as
t«nef iclery awy rtetrnslne.
U.

The ami/1 rig upon and taking possession of M i d property, the collection of auch rents, issues,

and profits, or the proceoda of fire and other insurance policies, or compensation or awards for any taking or
dnaege of sold property, and the application or releose thereof a* aforesaid, ahall not cure or waive any default or
notice of default hereunder or Invalidate any act done pursuant to such notice.
15.

The fatlire on the pert of bansflelery to pr**c*ly enforce ony right hersurrier shall not operate as a we<v«r

af auch right ervf the waiver by Denaflclary of any defaut* shell not constitute a waiver of ony other or subsequent
devault.
la.

Ti«s» 1a of tho •aaonoa hereof.

Upon default by Trvator In the peyaent of any fndebtsdntte secured hereby

or In th« perferaance of ony a g r m — n t hersunrter, ail suae secured hereby ahall laawjla'.ely becoae due and payeele et
the optic* of teneflciary.

In the event of auch default, teneflciary aay execute or cause Trustee to execute a

written notice of default and of election to cause M i d property to be M i d to satisfy the obi l oat ions hereof, and
Trustee shall file such notice for record In aach county wherein M i d property or ease pert or parcel thereof is
situated,

teneflciary also shall deposit with Trustee, the note and all docuamts evidencing expenditures secured

h«rsb>.
CO
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17. After the l*p»e «f sue* t f M M My than b« requirwd by law fallowing th« recordation of Mid notica of
dafault, and notica af aafeuU and notica of aala Having baan ajlvan a* than rehired by law, Truatae, without oamand
on Tnjatar, shall s e l l M U property an tKa data and at tha ttea and placa desianetad In aald notica af tale, atther
aa a whale or (A aaparata parcels, and In such ardor aa It aay datarailn* (but aubjact to any salutary right af
Trustor to dlract tha artier In which auch property, If conalattno af taveral known lota er parcela, ahall be aald),
at public auction to tha Maheat blduar, tha purchaaa prlea payable In lawful aoncy af tha United ftatee at tha tta*
of s a l s . Tha paraon conducting tha aala aay. for any cauaa ho daae* axpadlant. poatpone tha sale frost tiaa to tie*
until It ahetl be coaplated and. In every audi caae( notica of poatponeaan? ahall be flv*n by public declaration
thereof by euch prion at tha tlaa and placa teat appointed for tha aala; provided. If tha aala U postponed for
tenser than «r* day bayrd tha day daalanatad In tha notica of aala, notica tHareof ahall be given In tha tamt
aamer aa tha or Ifinal notice af 4als. Truatae ahall e*«cute and deliver to tha purchaaar Itt dead conveying aald
property ao sold, but without any convanant of warranty, axprssa or taplied. Tha recltala In tha Oaed of any aattera
or facta ahall be conclualva proof •i tha trvthfulneaa thareof. Any paraon, Including ienefIciary# My bid at the
aala. Truatae ahall apply tha proceeds 91 tha aala to oaywent of (1) the cocta mrd exr/snaae of ex<trcleing tha power
af aala aid ot the aala. Including tha peyaant af tha Truates'e and attorney'• feaa; <2) coat of any avidenca of
t i t l e procured In connect ten with auch aala and ravanua ateap* on Truataa'a 0«ad; (3) all SUM sxpended under the
term hereof, not than rape J d, with •ecnmd Intareat at
% p*r annua froa data of 9Kp*ndit\jC9; <*) alt ct.Her
•u*» than aeturad hereby; and <S> tfca rsavelndar. If any, ta tha paraon or peraona laaelly antltlad tharato, or tha
True tee. In t t t dtacratlon, a»y dapoalt tha balance of auch proceed* with tha County Clark of tha county In which
tha aala took placa.
UL Trustor agree* ta surrender poaaeeelan af tha hereinabove daacrlbad Truat property to tha furchaaer at tha
aforeaafd aala, lanadlataly after auch aala. In tha avent auch poasasalon haa net prevloualy bean surrendered by
Trustor.
19. Upon the occurence of any default Hereunder, fwnefIciary ahall Have tha option to d«lara all auna aecured
hereby leeaedfotaly due and payable mrd foracloaa thla Davd af Truat In tha aaoner provided by law for tha foracloaure
of aortoaoaa on real property arv* lenvfIciary ahall be antltlad to racever 1n auch proceodings all coite and axpormet
Incident tharato, Including a reeeonable euorney'a fee In auch e o a n t aa ahall be fixed by the court.
20. AanafUicry aay appoint a aucceeaor truatea at any tiaa by f l l l n j for record in the offic* of U»e Covntf
(•carder af each county In which jw»d property er soa* part thereof la altuatad, a aubatltution of t rut tee. fro*
tha tiaa tha aubatltution la Iliad for record, the new truatea ahall auccaad to a l l tha power*, Ojtitt, authority and
t i t l e of tha truatee fmmd herein er af any aucceeaor truatea, (ach auch ccbetitution ahall be aracuted mni
acknowledged, and notica thereof ahall be given end p^eof thereof aade, in tha canner provided by law.
21. ihla weed of Truat ahall apply ta. Wore ta tha benefit of, and bind all partiea hereto, their heira,
leoeteee, devleaee, arsolniatreiora, executor*, eucceteors and aaatnna. All obi I cat lone of Truator hereunder are
Joint and taveral. Tha terai •tanefIciary- *h*ll •ean tha owner end holder. Including eny pledge*, of the note
aecured heraby. In thla bead of Truat. wfvenever the context ao require*, tho aaacullne sender includes the foal nine
and/or neuter, and tha tInsular nuxtjer Includra the plural.
22. Trvatee accepts tf.ia Truat when thla Oeed of Truat, duly executed and actrwwledoad, U s*d* a public
record aa provided by law. Truatae la rot ctHloated to notify any party hereto of pending aaU u-v*cr any other
Oeed of Truat or of any action er proceeding In which Truator, geneficiary, or Truatea shall be a party, unlest
brought by Trustee.
23.

TMf, freed af Truat t t a l l be eonetruwd according to tha '.ewa of the S:*ta of Utah.

24. The underalanad Truator raqueata that a copy of any notlra of dafeult ani of any notica of tale hereunder
be aalted to eta at the eddreta herainbefora aet forth.
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On this 2 7 dwy of
JUNE
-ftnnPPT rr Uhonjurrm-l
**Ky acknowledged to M that
HE

19y91 t perscrady appeared before sw,
the si«n«r(s> of th« foregoing Iranjeent, who
executed tho s «

**T Cowaluton Expiree

Notary Publ
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« M £ Of L*TA*
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tho
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day of

, A.0. 19
personally appeared before aw t
**1
. *ho being by m duty sworn did My,
••ch for hleaelf, thet he, the said
U tho
President, and he,
t^e «a(d ______________________________________--_-____________•____
*• **»• .
Secretary
•* - ^ that tho within and foregoing tnsrupont was stoned
•«\ behalf of M i d eorpocstlo"* by wjthority of Its toorc! of 01 rectors, orrf sold
__
and
•Vh dulyftcfcnowledojadto aw that said corporation executed the %am and that the seel affixed
***• Mai of Mid corporation.

Notary Public
*V Couftlsston Expiree

Residing att

Do Not Accord

tfOJC.f rOB fULL ttCOWETAHC€
(To be used only when 1ndebte<*-t»«s secured hereby has been paid in full)
10
The unriersiftrted i s the l***l owner and holder af the note and all other indebtedness secured by the within
weed of Trust. ^\4 ro\*, together with a l l other indebtedness secured by Mid Deed of Trust has beer, fully paid
and satisfied; ar^ yoQ _,-, fcersoy requested end directed, on pey-ent to you of any SUMS owing to you under the tere*
of Mid Deed of tsust, to cancel Mid note enove Mentioned, and a l l other evidences of indebtedness secured by Mid
Deed of Iruat deliv*--^ t t ^ Ktrewith, together with the Mid Oeed of Trust, and to recenvjy. without warranty, to
the parties cfc«<tnat«d by the teoea of Mid ©eed of trust all the estate now held by you thereunder.

Mall reconveyance t o
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AGREEMENT

This Agreement made t h i s
fi
day of December/ 19992, among
MARILYN HAMILTON PETERSON ("Peterson")/ ROBERT L. HARRINGTON
("Harrington*) and HARRINGTON PROPERTIES/ INC.
R E C I T A L S »

A.
Harrington executed a Trust Deed Note dated June 21/
1991/ made payable to Peterson in the principal amount of NinetyFive Thousand Dollars ($95/000) secured by a Deed of Trust dated
June 21/ 1991, Said Trust Deed was recorded June 27# 1991# as
Entry No, 5088815 in Book 6330 at Page 2939 of the official records
of the Salt Lake County Recorder (the "Trust Deed") and affects the
following described real property located in Salt Lake County/
State of Utahi
Lot 17/ SUNSET OAKS SUBDIVISION/ Plat "BH according
to the official plat thereof on file in the Salt
Lake County Recorder's office. (the "Property")
B.
Harrington Properties, Inc. is currently the owner of the
Property ("Owner").
C.
Harrington has caused and is causing improvements to be
constructed on the Property (the "Work") and has been acting as the
general contractor in connection with that construction.
D.
Additional funds are needed to complete the construction
of the improvements on the Property.
E.
Peterson is willing to advance additional funds to be
used for that purpose and Harrington and the Owner are willing that
said advances be secured by the Trust Deed.
NOW/ THEREFORE/ for good and valuable consideration, the
receipt and adequacy of which are hereby acknowledged/ the parties
agree as followst
1*
Advance of Additional Funds bv Petereoni Peterson agrees
to advance funds in an amount not to exceed the total sum of
Seventy-Five Thousand Dollars ($75/000) for the sole purpose of
paying necessary costs and expenses incurred by Harrington to
construct and make improvements to the Property.

12.

2
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Harrington and the Owner acknowledge that before Peterson
shall be obligated to pay any sum or sums under this Agreement, she
shall be entitled to receive written verification satisfactory to
her of the amount(s) to be paid for the Work and, at her option,
may require the delivery of lien waivers and/or releases
satisfactory to her* Peterson's payments under this Agreement may
be made to or for the benefit of vendors, material men, laborers,
subcontractors and contractors who have participated in performing
the Work and shall be made within three (3) business days following
her receipt of said written verification, lien waivers and/or
releases.

2.

Warranties of Harrington and the Owner* Harrington and

the Owner represent and warrant that all funds advanced by Peterson
pursuant to the terms of this Agreement shall only be used to pay
for the Work and for no other purpose,
3.
Obligation of Harrington and Owner; In addition to the
payment of the sum of Ninety-Five Thousand Dollars ($95,000) owed
to her on the original Trust Deed Note dated June 21, 1991,
Peterson shall be entitled to the payment of all sums advanced by
her pursuant to the terms of this Agreement, together with
attorneys fees incurred by her relating in any way to the
negotiations for and preparation of this Agreement, plus accruing
interest. Interest on the unpaid balance of each sum advanced by
Peterson pursuant to Paragraph 1 above shall be calculated from the
date each sum has been advanced by her until she has been repaid in
full at the prime rate then charged by Valley Bank & Trust Company
plus four (4) percentage points.
4.
Payment Due Date: Payment of the sum owed by Harrington
under the terms of the original Trust Deed Note ($95,000) and
payment of the sums advanced by Peterson under the terms of this
Agreement (not to exceed an additional $75,000) shall be due on the
date the Property is sold by the Owner or is otherwise transferred,
conveyed or assigned.
The parties agree that Petersonfs sole recourse to recover the
sums of money advanced by her under the terms of this Agreement,
plus interest and attorney fees, and to recover the sum of NinetyFive Thousand Dollars ($95,000) owed to her under the terms of the
original Trust Deed Note, shall be against the Property and/or the
proceeds arising from its sale or transfer.

•0r,pet-h«r.igr
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5*
Defaults
Harrington and the Owner will be in default
under the terms of this Agreement if they fail to cause Peterson to
be paid at the time of the sale or transfer of the Property; any
representation or statement made or furnished to Peterson by
Harrington or the Owner pursuant to the terms hereof is false and
misleading in any material respect; or the Owner and/or Harrington
transfer or assign the Property without the prior written consent
of Peterson*
6.
Attorney Fees. If Harrington or the Owner defaults under
the terms of this Agreement, Peterson shall be entitled to recover
all costs incurred by her in enforcing the terms hereof, including
reasonable attorney fees, subject to the limitation that her
recourse to recover the same shall be against the Property and/or
the proceeds arising from its sale or transfer.
7.
Governing Lav, This Agreement shall be governed by and
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah.
8.
Collateral. This Agreement is secured by a Trust Deed
dated June 21, 1991, more particularly referred to in Paragraph 1
above.
9.
Assignment. Harrington may not transfer or assign his
rights under this Agreement, without the prior written consent of
Peterson, who may withhold that consent for any reason.
10.
Amendments.
This Agreement may not be amended or
modified except by an instrument in writing signed by each of the
parties to this Agreement.
11.
Counterparts.
This Agreement may be executed in
counterparts, each of which shall be deemed to be an original, and
together shall constitute one and the same agreement.
12.
Binding Effect. All of the terms and conditions of this
Agreement shall be binding upon and inure to the benefit of the
heirs, assigns, successors, and other legal representatives of the
parties.
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February 18, 1993
Marilyn Peterson
Hamilton Investment Co.
60 So* Temple Suite 1200
Salt Lake Cityf Utah 84111
RE:

Sums advanced in additon to $75,000.00, (December 8, 1992

Agreement) .
Dear Marilynt
This letter will confirm that any money advanced by you, above and
beyond the $75,000.00 (December 8 1992 Agreement), for the purpose
of construction of the home located at 1656 S. sunset Oaks Dr.,

will be returned to you with interest consistent with the rate of
interest in our Agreement dated December 8, 1992, and will be
returned to you prior to the distribution of any proceeds to
Harrington Properties Inc. The sale of the house will be the sole
source of the return of this money.
Thank you for your help and cooperation*
Sincerely,

Bob Harrington

U

